Long run implications of the increase in taxation and public debt for employment and economic growth in Europe. Economic Papers No. 49, August 1986 by Tullio, Giuseppe
HPBRS
COMMISSIOIII  OF THE EUBOPEAfl  COIUIMI}ITITI.fS O OIFECTORATE.GEIUERAT  FOB ECOITOMIC  ATD FITTAilCIAI AFFAINS
BCN IC
No. 49 August 1986
Long run imptications of the increase in taxation
and pubtic debt for emptoyment and economic Arouth in Europe*
by
Giuseppe Tul. Iio"Economic Papers" are written by the Staff of the Directorate-GeneraL
for Economic and FinanciaL Affairs, or by experts working in association
with them.  The "Papers" are intended to jncrease awareness of the
technicaL work being done by the staff  and to seek comments  and
suggestjons for funther anaLyses- They may not be quoted wjthout
authorisation.  Views expressed represent excLusiveLy the positions
of the author and do not necessariLy correspond with those of the
Commi ssion of the European Communi ties.  Comments  and enquj ri es
shouLd be addressed to
The Djrectorate-GeneraL for  Economic and Financ'iaL Affairs,
Commi ssi on of the Eunopean Communi t i es,
2OO, rue de La Loi
1049 BrusseLs, BeLgiumECONOMIC  PAPERS 
No.  49  August  1986 
Long  run  implications of  the  increase  in  taxation 
and  public debt  for  employment  and  economic  growth 
in  Europe* 
by 
Giuseppe  Tullio 
Internal  Paper 
*  This  paper  is part  of  a  broader  research  on  the  long  run  and  short  run 
effects of  the  growth  of  government  expenditure,  taxation and  public 
debt  on  the  European  economies,  carried out  by  the  ad  hoc  group  on 
public  finance  questions  set  up  in  May  1984  within  the  Directorate 
General  for  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs.  The  views  expressed  in this 
paper  are  personal  and  do  not  involve  the  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities  nor  the  Directorate General  for  Economic  and  Financial 
Affairs.  I  am  grateful  to  David  Begg,  Martin  Feldstein,  Robert  Gordon, 
Antony  Knoester,  Jurgen  Kroger,  J~rgen Mortensen,  Massimo  Russo  and 
Douglas  Todd  for  useful  suggestions  on  earlier drafts of this paper. 
This  paper  was  presented at  the  INTERNATIONAL  SEMINAR  ON  MACROECONOMICS, 
co-sponsored  by  the National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research  CN.B.E.R.)  and 
the  Maison  de  Science de  l'Homme  on  JUne  22-24,  1986- Namur,  Belgium. 
II/332/86-EN  This  paper  only exists  in  English. -1-
1.  Introduction 
Economic  policy makers  typically are interested in  the  effects of 
their actions  over  a  relatively short  time  horizon stretching say  from  one 
quarter to one  to  two  years.  The  effects of their actions over a  long  time 
period  say  10  to  20  years  is  often  beyond  their  interest.  In  a  rather 
parallel  fashion,  there  is  a  great  deal  of  economic  analysis  of  the  short 
run effects of  fiscal  policy whereas  analysis  of  the very  long  run effects 
of fiscal actions has attracted relatively little attention at least in the 
post world war  II period.  The  few  more  recent contributions are cast with-
in  abstract  and  mathematical  growth  models  generally  of  not  easy  under-
standing for  a  typical policy maker. 
The  role of  the government  sector in all economies  of  the European 
Community  (EC)  has  grown  substantially in  the last  two  and  a  half  decades. 
Although it is very difficult  to measure  the  size of  the government  sector 
in relation to  the  overall  economy,  the  ratio of general  government  e~pen­
diture  to  the  national  product  can  give  a  rough  idea  of  the  magnitudes 
involved.  This  ratio  however,  on  the  one  hand,  underestimates  the  degree 
to  which  the  government  sector  intervenes  in  the  private  economy.  This  is 
because  intervention through regulations and  legislative means  which  do  not 
give rise to direct disbursements  from  the general government  budget  do  not 
affect  the ratio.  Similarly,  the  e~tent of  the  operations  of  state-owned 
enterprises  are  generally not  reflected  in  the  ratio.  On  the other  hand, 
this ratio overstates  the  degree  of  government  influence  on  the  economy  to 
the  extent  that  governments  increasingly  have  become  "financial 
intermediaries"  by  transferring  money  collected  from  ta~es  and  sales  of 
bonds  to  households  or  firms.  While  such  financial  intermediation has  an 
impact  on  the  allocation of  resources,  this  impact  is much  weaker  than  if 
the government  bought  goods  and  services itself. This is especially true if 
the  funds  are  transferred  in  a  non-discriminatory  way.  In  this  paper  we 
shall  nevertheless  use  the  ratio  of  general  government  e~penditure  to 
national  product as  proxy for  the size of government. -2-
The  increase  in  the  size  of  government  which  occurred  after  1960 
in Europe  is roughly comparable with the increase which occurred during and 
after the first world war.  In Germany  for  instance total government  expen-
diture  as  a  ratio  to  net  national  product1  was  10.5  per  cent  in  1881  and 
18.5  per cent  in 19132.  It almost  doubled  to  34.1  per cent  by  1930.  From 
1960  to  1979  the  ratio  increased  from  35.2  to  53.6  per cent3.  It stood at 
about  54  in 1984. 
This  paper  analyses  the  long  run effects  of  the  observed  protrac-
ted  growth  in  government  expenditure  and  the  accompanying  growth  in  tax-
ation  and/or  public  debt  in  the  EC  on  employment  and  economic  growth  from 
1960  to  1984.  The  object  is  to  indentify  possible  policy  options  for  the 
EC  governments'  fiscal strategy in the  long run.  If for  instance it can be 
established  that  the  current  high  levels  of  unemployment  and  the  very 
different  employment  performance  of  the  EC  with  respect  to  say  Japan  and 
the  US  in  the  last  decade  or  so  have  something  to  do  with  the  different 
growth  in  the  size  of  governments  during  the  period,  clear  fiscal  policy 
conclusion  would  follow  for  at  least  the  remainder  of  this  century.  A 
similar  conclusion  holds  if it can  be  shown  that  the  large increase in the 
size  of  the  government  sector  which  has  occurred  in  Europe  from  1960 
onwards  has  affected real economic  growth adversely. 
It is very difficult  to  reach  firm  conclusions  about  the  long  run 
effects  of  the  size  of  government  on  employment  and  economic  growth  since 
the  variables  which  play  a  crucial role  are  many  and  the  problem  does  not 
lend itself to  easy  tre~tment within a  formal model.  It makes  a  difference 
in  the  long  run  whether  it  is  public  investment,  current  government 
expenditure on  goods  and  services,  or  transfers which grow.  The  effects on 
capital  accumulation  and  on  the  misallocation  of  resources  may  be  very 
different.  In  addition  the  various  categories  of  expenditure  can  be 
valued  very  differently  by  the  recipients  of  the  services  and  the 
transfers.  How  wage  earners  value  the  growth  in public  expenditure is very 
1  Long  historical series  for  Germany  are  available  only  for  net national 
product.  See  w.  Hoffmann  (1965). 
2  Appendix  2  contains a  table with  the ratios of  German  government  expen-
diture  to  NNP,  excluding  and  including  transfers,  every  10  years  from 
1881  to  1979. 
3  The  source  of  the  numerator  is  OECD  (1983)  and  of  the  denominator 
Statistisches Bundesamt  (1983). -3-
important for  wage  behaviour,  since if they value it highly,  they should  be 
willing  to accept  some  reduction  (or less growth)  in net wage  income,  while 
if  they  value  it  little  they  will  attempt  to  shift  forward  the  higher 
taxation,  thereby increasing the real product wage.  In a  highly integrated 
world  in  which  European  firms  compete  with  firms  located  in  areas  where 
taxes  on labour and  labour costs in general grew much  less,  they may  not  be 
able  to  pass  all  the  increase  in  costs  on  to  the  consumers;  this  will 
influence profits, capital accumulation and  the international allocation of 
capital.  Similarly the way  in which  a  given size of government  is financed 
matters.  Does  an  increase  in  taxation,  with  the  ratio  of  public  debt  to 
gross  domestic  product  remaining  constant,  have  the  same  effect  as  an 
increase in the  public  debt/GDP  ratio with  the ratio of  tax revenues  to  GDP 
remaining  constant?  Also  important  is  which  type  of  taxes  create  less 
disincentives  to  employment  and  less  microeconomic  distortions.  The 
difficulty  of  reaching  firm  conclusions  about  the  long  run  macroeconomic 
effect of  the  size of  government  on  employment  and  economic  growth is also 
due  to  the  fact  that  taxation,  government  expenditure  and  regulations  have 
in  the  first  place  micro-economic  effects.  Even  if  it  was  possible  to 
reach  firm  conclusions  about  the  micro-economic  effects  of  each  type  of 
tax,  each  expenditure  program  and  each  regulation,  enormous  problems  of 
aggregation would  remain. 
Furthermore,  even if one  could establish firmly  that the growth  in 
government  expenditure  and  taxation  which  has  occurred  in  Europe  in  the 
last  25  years  has  had  a  very  negative  effect  on  employment  creation  and 
economic  growth,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  the  size  of 
government  would  have  to  be  rolled  back.  A  social  welfare  function  is 
needed  to  weight  the  costs  of  a  larger  government,  in  terms  of  lower 
employment  and  economic  growth,  against  the  benefits  of  more  equality  and 
larger welfare  programmes. 
Despite  the  difficulties  involved  in  reaching  firm  macroeconomic 
conclusions,  of  which  the  above  mentioned  are  only  a  sample,  the  paper 
tries to isolate a  number  of major  channels  through which  the growth in the 
size  of  government  could  affect  employment  and  economic  growth,  the  most 
important  being  the  effect  of  higher  taxation  on  labour  costs  and  on  the 
demand  for  labour by  the  private sector.  It concludes  that,  given  the  way 
the  government  sector  has  grown  in  European  countries  since  about  1960, -4-
there  is  a  strong  presumption  that  the  effect  has  been  on  balance 
negative.  By  implication  therefore,  this  paper  suggests  that  the  social 
costs  of  large  government  sectors  are  probably  higher  than  generally 
believed. 
The  paper is structured as  follows:  Section 2  reviews briefly the 
development  of  two  sets  of  variables  for  the  aggregate  of  the  EC,  the  US 
and  Japan  from  1960  to  1985.  The  first  set  of  variables  contains  the 
ratios  of  general  government  expenditure,  taxation  and  public  debt  to  GDP 
in  the  EC,  US  and  Japan  (exogenous  fiscal variables).  It also  contains 
the  ratio  of  direct  taxes  on  labour  income  and  social  security contribu-
tions  to  the  net  take-home  wage.  The  second  set  of  variables  contains 
employment,  unemployment,  the capital-labour ratio and  real  GOP  growth,  the 
evolution  of  which  may  be  determined  in  part  by  the  fiscal  variables. 
Hence  they can be  regarded as  being at least partly endogenous.  At  the end 
of  this  section  a  cross-section  regression  analysis  of  10  industrial 
countries  identifies  a  significant  negative  correlation  between  real 
economic  performance and  the growth of government  expenditure,  taxation and 
the  taxation wedge  between  gross  and  net  wages.  It is shown  that in those 
countries  where  the  exogenous  fiscal  variables  grew  more,  economic  growth 
and  employment  creation slowed  down  most  during  the  sample  period.  However 
not  too  much  importance  should  be  attached  to  these  regression  results, 
because  they  may  be  flawed  by  a  number  of  econometric  problems  and  by  the 
aggregation of all government  expenditure and  revenues.  More  weight should 
be  put  on  the  remainder  of  the  paper  which  deals  with  some  theoretical 
reasons  for  expecting  the causality to run mostly  from  the growth of fiscal 
variables  to higher unemployment  and  lower  economic  growth. 
The  first  channel  through which  the  size of  government  may  affect 
employment  and  growth  that  is  analyzed  is  how  higher  taxes  are  likely to 
influence  labour  costs  and  the  demand  for  labour  by  the  private  sector. 
The  starting  point  for  the  analysis  of  this  channel  is  the  model  of  Adam 
Smith and  David  Ricardo.  They  believed  that all taxes  on  wages  were  more 
or  less  fully  shifted  forward  onto  higher  labour  costs,  because real after 
tax  wages  were  rigid  downwards,  being  fixed  at  the  level  of  subsistance. -5-
In  addition,  in  an  open  economy,  even  one  as  large  as  the  United  Kingdom 
during  their time,  industrial prices could not  be  increased  to  the  point of 
fully  reflecting  the  higher  labour  costs,  due  to  foreign  competition. 
Hence,  they  believed  that  taxes  on  the  wages  of  labour,  taxes  on 
necessities  and  in  part  taxes  on  luxuries  were  leading  to  lower 
employment.  They  also believed  that  these  taxes  were  taxes  on  profits and 
that  they  had  a  negative  effect  on  capital  accumulation  in  the  long  run. 
Two  assumptions  of  Smith  and  Ricardo's  theory  are  crucial  for  their 
conclusions.  Firstly the notion that public expenditure was  useless  to  the 
worker,  being  generally  expenditure  to  finance  wars,  and  secondly  Malthus 
"subsistence theory  of  wages".  The  subsistence  theory of  wages  is clearly 
inapplicable  under  post  World  War  II circumstances.  However,  ironically, 
if  labour  unions  have  a  monopoly  power  and  fix  net  wage  income  to  some 
extent exogenously,  the Smith/Ricardo model  can still be useful.  In the  US 
instead,  where  labour  unions  do  not  possess  the  same  degree  of  monopoly 
power  and  the  incidence  of  direct  taxes  on  dependent  labour  income  and 
social  security  contributions  is  likely  to  fall  relatively  more  on  wage 
earners,  the effects of the growth of government  are  probably less negative 
than  those predicted by Smith and  Ricardo. 
Section 3  deals with  the  implications of  the  functioning  of  labour 
markets  in Europe  for wage  behaviour.  The  incidence of direct and  indirect 
taxation on  the  distribution of  income  and  the effects of  tax induced wage 
increases  on  the  demand  for  labour  by  firms  and  the  supply  of  labour  by 
workers  are  dealt  with.  The  effect  of  higher  taxes  on  the  demand  for 
labour  depends  not  only  on  the  behaviour  of  wages,  but  also  on  the  price 
behaviour  by  firms,  since  the  demand  for  labour  depends  on  the  product 
wage.  Recent  empirical  work  on  the  elasticity  of  demand  for  labour  by 
firms  with  respect  to  the  product  wage  is  surveyed,  showing  that  higher 
wage  costs  can  considerably  reduce  the  demand  for  labour  by  the  private 
sector. 
Smith  and  Ricardo's  assumption  that  public expenditure  is useless 
is  an  excessive  simplification.  Section  4  analyses  the  implications  for 
macroeconomic  equilibrium  of  a  positive  value  placed  by  workers  and  tax 
payers  on  growing  public expenditure.  The  problem is dealt with first at a 
theoretical  level,  then  a  highly  conjectural  attempt  is  made  to  assess -6-
qualitatively  the  value  attributed  by  European  workers  to  the  growth  in 
government  e~penditure which has  occurred in the last two  decades or so. 
Section 5  tries to  assess  the effects of  the  growth  of  government 
expenditure  and  ta~ation  on  capital  accumulation  in  Europe,  by  analysing 
the  effects  on  household  savings  of  the  e~pansion  of  social  security 
systems,  of  the  changes  in  after  tax  interest  rates  and  of  the  reduction 
(or  smaller  growth)  of  disposable  income.  The  effects  on  private  savings 
are different  depending  on  the  type  of  government  e~penditure;  three  types 
of  government  e~penditure  are  distinguished:  public  investment,  direct 
purchases  of  goods  and  services  and  transfers.  This  section  also  deals 
briefly with  the effects on private capital accumulation of  a  debt  financed 
growth  in  government  expenditure.  It is  concluded  that  of  all  forms  of 
financing  government  e~penditure, debt  financed  government  e~penditure has 
the most  negative effect on  private capital accumulation. 
Finally  Section  6  draws  policy  implications  for  European  fiscal 
policy in the  long  run and  the  short run. 
2.  The  growth  of  government  expenditure  and  taxation  in  the  EC,  US  and 
Japan  from  1960  to 1985 
This  section summarises  in Tables  1  to  3  the  growth  of  government 
e~penditure,  ta~ation and  public debt in EC  countries  from  1960  to  1985  and 
compares  it with  experience  in  the  US  and  Japan.  Tables  4  to  7  contain 
comparisons  of  the  variables  which  government  e~penditure,  taxation  and 
public debt  can  influence:  the wedge  between  labour  costs  and  wages  net  of 
social security contributions  and  direct  taxes  (Table  4),  the  growth  rates 
of  employment,  the  levels  of  unemployment  (Table  5),  the  growth  rates  of 
real  GDP  per  capita  (Table  6)  and  of  capital  labour  ratios  (Table  7). 
Since  several  studies  of  the  development  of 
e~ist, this section will be kept very short.1 
these  variables  already 
1  See  Todd  (1983),  Committee  of  Governors  of  the  Central  Banks  of  the 
Member  States  of  the  European  Community,  (1983),  Wegner  (1983)  and 
European  Economy  (1984). -7-
Table  1  shows  that  general  government  e~penditure1 as  a  ratio  of 
GDP  increased  by  about  20  percentage  points  in  the  European  Community  from 
1960  to  1985,  the  ratio  increased  by  about  9  percentage  points  in  the  US 
and  by  about  17  percentage  points  in  Japan.  Since  Europe  had  already  the 
highest  government  e~penditure  to  GDP  ratio  in  1960,  in  1985  the  ratio 
e~ceeded in Europe  that of  the  US  by  about  16  percentage points.  Total  tax 
receipts,  including  social  security  contributions  show  a  similar  pattern 
(Table  2).  They  increased  from  1960  to  1985  by  about  14  percentage points 
in the European Community,  by 4.5  percentage points in the  US  and  from  1960 
to  1983  by  about  10  in  Japan.  The  growth  of  government  e~penditure  was 
much  more  pronounced  than the growth of taxation especially in the European 
Community  and  in  the  us.  By  1985  ta~ation  and  social  security 
contributions were  46.5  per  cent  of  GDP  in the European  Community  and  31.9 
per  cent  in  the us.  In  1983  they  were  30.8  per  cent  in Japan.  The  gross 
public debt  rose  sharply in all three  blocks  from  1980  to  1985  (Table  3). 
In  Japan it had  risen sharply also  from  the  mid-1970s  to  1980  while  in the 
US  it had  fallen  sharply  from  1960  to  1973.  By  1985  the  ratio  of  gross 
~-
public  debt  to  GDP  was  the  highest  in  the  Community  where  it had  reached 
about  61  per  cent.  In  several  of  the  Community  countries  the  ratio  was 
significantly above  100  per cent2. 
The  growth  in  ta~ation  and  social  security  contributions  had  a 
considerable  impact  on  the  wedge  between  gross  wages  and  wages  net  of 
social  security  contributions  and  direct  and  indirect  ta~es  falling  upon 
dependent  labourers.  Table  4A  contains  the  narrower  wedge,  which  includes 
social  security  contributions  paid  by  employers  and  employees  and  an 
estimate of direct  ta~es paid  by  dependent  labourers,  as  a  fraction of  the 
wage  net  of  social  security  contributions  and  direct  ta~es.  Table  4B 
contains  the  e~tended  wedge  which · includes  an  estimate  of  indirect  ta~es 
paid  by dependent  labourers,  as a  fraction of the wage  net of contributions 
and  direct  and  indirect  ta~es.  Unless  the  workers  suffer  from  fiscal 
I  General  government  e~penditure  includes  e~penditures  by  local 
governments  and  e~penditure on  social security. 
2  In  1985  the  ratio  was  116.9  per  cent  in  Belgium,  117.1  per  capita  in 
Ireland and  103.8  per cent in Italy. -8-
Table 1:  General  Government  expenditure  as  a  fraction  of  GDP  in  the  EC, 
the  US  and  Japan.(1),  196Q-1985 
EC(2) 
USA 
Japan 
1960 
32,1 
26,8 
18,2 
(1)In per cent. 
(2)EUR-9 
1973 
39,8 
30,7 
22,1 
1980 
47,4 
33,1 
32,4 
1983 
51,8 
35,5 
34,9 
1984 
52,1 
34,3 
n.a. 
1985 
51,5 
35,5 
n.a. 
Source:  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  European  Economy,  various 
issues,  and  Economic  Report of  the President,  February 1986. 
Table  2:  Government  Receipts  as  a  fraction  of  GDP  in the  EC,  the  US  and 
Japan(1),1960-1985. 
1960  1973  1980  1983  1984  1985 
EC(2)  32,7  39,1  43,7  46,4  46,8  46,5 
USA  27,4  31,2  31,9  31,6  31,4  31,9 
Japan  20,7  22,4  28,0  30,8  n.a.  n.a. 
(1)In per cent,  including social security contributions. 
(2)  UR-9 
Source:  See  Table  1 -9-
Table  3:  Gross  public  debt  as  a  fraction  of  GDP  in  the  EC,  the  US  and 
Japan(1),  196Q-1983. 
1960  1973  1980  1983  1984  1985 
EC(2)  40,7  44,5  55,0  58,2  61,1 
us  45,9  25,3  27,5  35,1  36,9  n.a. 
Japan  22,5(3)  52,9  68,2  69,3  69,4 
(1)In per cent. 
(2)EUR-8,  weighted arithmetic mean  e~cluding Greece  and  Ireland 
(3)1975 
Source:  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  International  Monetary 
Fund,  IFS,  various  issues  and  OECD,  Economic  Outlook,  December 
1985.  For  the  USA  central government  debt·~ - 10-
illusion,  the  extended  wedge  is  the  most  relevant  one,  since  the  real 
buying  power  of  the  worker  is  to  a  large extent  independent  of  whether  he 
pays  more  direct  taxes  and  less  sales  or  value  added  taxes  or  vice  versa. 
However  his  labour-leisure  and  consumption-saving  choices  and  the 
composition of his  consumption  depend  on  marginal  tax  rates.  In  Germany, 
France,  the Netherlands  and  Sweden  the extended wedge  was  in 1983  well over 
100  per  cent  of  the  net  wage  and  more  than  double  than  in  the  US  and 
Japan.  In Italy the wedge  was  72.3  per  cent in 1983,  but  the figures might 
be  distorted  by  forms  of  taxation not  included  in  the  wedge.  Such  forms 
are  the inflation tax,  the direct  payment  for  public  services (e.g.  highway 
tolls  for  example)  and  the  fact  that  the  social  security  system  which  is 
unfunded  presents  a  huge  deficit which  is covered  by  the  Italian Treasury. 
Finally,  the  Italian  government  has  for  many  years  paid  a  part  of  social 
security  contributions  (fiscalizzazione degli  oneri  sociali).  Also  in  the 
UK  the  figure  appearing  in  the  table  for  the  extended  wedge  was  much 
smaller  than  in  other  European  countries,  probably  because  of  the  larger 
role  played  in  the  UK  by  private  pension  schemes.  The  extended  wedge 
increased  moderately  from  1960  to  1983  in  the  US  (about  7  percentage 
points)  and  in Italy (about  14  percentage  points).  It  increased  by  about 
23  percentage  points  in  Japan,  while  in  all  other  European  countries  it 
increased  considerably  by  35-36  percentage  points  in  Germany,  France  and 
the  UK  and  by  80  and  97  percentage points in the Netherlands  and  Sweden. 
Table  5  compares  the  growth  in  employment  in  the  Community  with 
the  growth in the  US  and  Japan.  From  1960  to  1985  employment  increased by 
about  1.8  per  cent  per  year  in  the  US  and  1.1  per  cent  in  Japan  while it 
did  not  increase  in  the  Community.  The  difference  in  employment 
performance  was  particularly  large  in  the  period  1980-1985  when  in  the 
Community  employment  fell  by  about  0.5  per  cent  per  year,  while  it 
increased  by  about  1.2  per  cent  in  the  US  and  1.1  in  Japan.  The  rates  of 
unemployment  reported  in  the  bottom  part  of  the  table  reflect  the  more 
unsatisfactory  employment  growth  in  the  Community  with  respect  to  the 
growth of  the  labour  force. 
Table  6  shows  that,  comparing  the  pre  and  post  1973  periods,  the 
growth  rates  of  real  GDP  per  capita  slowed  down  the  most  in  Japan  and  the - II 
Table 4A:  Estimate of the wedge  between gross wages  and  wages  net of direct 
taxes  and  social  security  contributions  in  selected  European 
countries,  the  US  and  Japan,(1)  1960-1983. 
1960  1973  1980  1983 
Germany  42,5  59,3  66,1  69,9 
France  39,8  51,2  69,5  74,5 
UK  23,1  32,0  34,9  39,4 
Italy  32,9  37,5  49,0  47,1 
Netherlands  43,4  74,1  81,8  103,2 
Sweden  32,0  55,3  79,7  78,1 
USA  29,2  35,7  39,1  36,9 
Japan  18,3  26,3  33,6  37,8 
(1)In per cent of  the net wage.  Total direct taxes  have  been split between 
dependent  labourers  and  self-employed  according  to  the  share  of 
compensation of employees  (net of  taxes)  in disposable  income. 
Source:  OECD,  national accounts. 
Table  4B:  Estimate of the wedge  between gross wages  and  wages  net of direct 
and  indirect taxes and  social security contributions in selected 
European countries,  the  US  and Japan,(1)  196Q-1983. 
1960  1973  1980  1983 
Germany  77,9  102,3  109,2  112,5 
France  82,5  92,1  113,8  118,9 
UK  51,6  64,8  76,4  87,4 
Italy  58,8  56,9  71,5  72,3 
Netherlands  68,8  111,7  124,0  148,0 
Sweden  55,9  110,4  139,5  153,1 
USA  48,8  56,7  57,9  56,0 
Japan  31,7  41,0  49,2  54,8 
(1)In  per  cent  of  the  net  wage.  Indirect  taxes  have  been  split  between 
dependent  labourers  and  self-employed  using  the  same  criteria  as  for 
direct taxes  in Table  4A. 
Source:  OECD,  national accounts. -12-
Table  5:  Growth  in  total  employment  and  unemployment  in  the  EC,  US  and 
Japan,  196Q-1985 
Employm.ent(l) 
1960-1973  1973-1980  1980-1985  ,196D-1985 
EC(2)  0,23  0,19  -0,50  0,05 
USA  1,87  1,9~  1,19  1,75 
Japan  1,26  0,73  1,12  1,09 
Unemployment(3) 
1960  1973  1980  1983 
EC(4)  2,5  2,5  5,8  10,4 
USA  5,5  4,9  7,1  9,6 
Japan  1,7  1,3  2,0  2,7 
(1)Average  geometric 
(2)EC-10. 
growth rates. 
(3)In per cent of labour force. 
(4)EC-9. 
(5)September  1985 
1984  1985(5) 
10,9  11,1 
7,5  7,1 
2,7  2,7 
Source:  OECD  (1984);  and  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities, 
European  Economy,  Supplement  A,  No.  12,  December  1984  and  No.12, 
December  1985. 
Table  6:  Real  GDP  growth  per  capita  in  the  EC,  the  US  and  Japan(1) 1 
1960-1985. 
1960-1973 
EC(2)  3,81 
USA  2,76 
Japan  8,59 
1973-1980 
1,95 
1,#14 
2,77 
1980-1985(3) 
1,05 
1,53 
3,22 
(1)Average  geometric growth rates. 
(2)EC-10. 
(3)The  figure  for  1985  is preliminary 
Source:  European  Commission. 
1960-1985(3) 
2,73 
2,07 
5,84 - 13-
least  in  the  us.  But  from  1980  onwards,  Europe's  growth  performance  was 
the most  disappointing.  Table  7  compares  the  growth  in the capital labour 
ratio  in  the  Community  with  those  in  the  US  and  Japan.  In  the  1960s  the 
growth in the capital labour ratio was  much  higher in the  Community  than in 
Japan  and  in the  US  and  it slowed  down  only marginally  for  the  average  of 
the  Community  in  the  1970s  and  the  early  1980s.  In  some  countries  like 
France and  the  UK  the growth of  the capital labour ratio accelerated in the 
1970s.  As  has  been  shown  by  Todd  (1983,  1984)  and  Mortensen  (1984),  these 
developments  can be  associated with  the  larger  increase  in  the wage-rental 
ratio  in  Europe  and  they  can  therefore  ultimately also  be  related  to  the 
growth  in  taxation  of  labour  and  with  the  development  of  general  labour 
costs. 
The  last  part  of  this  section  contains  simple  cross  country 
regressions  between  the  fiscal  variables  of  Tables  1,  2  and  4  and  the 
"endogenous"  variables  of  Tables  5  and  6,  showing  that  in  the  countries 
where  government  expenditure,  taxation  and  the  wedge  grew  most,  the 
performance  of  employment  and  economic  growth  was  less  satisfactory.  The 
regressions are of  the  type: 
(1) 
where  Y is real  GDP  per  capita  or  employment.  A dot  above  the  variable  Y 
stands  for  the  geometric  average  annual  growth  rate  during  the  periods 
1960-68,  1969-75  and  1976-83  and  i  indicates  the  country.  The  countries 
in  the  sample  are  the  big  four  European  countries  plus  Belgium,  Denmark, 
the Netherlands,  Sweden,  the  US  and  Japan.  The  independent variables X are 
respectively  the  average  ratio  of  government  expenditure  to  GDP,  of 
government  receipts  to  GDP  and  the  two  measures  of  the wedge  between  gross 
wages  and  net wages  reported in Table  4.  A bar above  the variable· X stands 
for  the  arithmetic  average  for  the  periods  1961-68,  1969-75  and  1976-83. 
The  variable  Z stands for  the arithmetic average of  the ratio of exports  to 
GDP  during  the  same  three periods.  It is intended  to test the relevance of 
the  theory of  "export led growth".  Finally,  P is a  dummy  variable which is 
equal  to  the  average  ratio of  oil  imports  to  GDP  in  the  years  immediately - 14-
Table 7:  Growth  in the  capital  labour  ratio  in  some  EC  countries,  US  and 
Japan(1),  196G-1981. 
1960-1970  1970-1981  1980-1984  1960-1981 
Germany(2)  4,6  4,3  4,6 
France(2)  3,9  4,9  4,5 
UK(2)  4,4  5,2  4,8 
Italy(2)  4,3  3,6  4,1 
EC-10(3)  3,8  3,2  3,0  3,5 
US(3)  1,1  0,3  0,8  0,7 
Japan(3)  1,6  3,7  2,5  2,7 
1  Average  geometric growth rates. 
2  Total industry;  Source:  Todd  (1984). 
3  Economy  wide  ratios.  Source:  Commission  of  the  European  Communities, 
European Economy,  No.20,  July 1984. ~3) 
- 15-
following  the  first  oil  shock  (1975-1978)  for  the  period  1976-83  and  zero 
for  the  two  previous  periods.  This  variable  is  intended  to  capture  the 
effect  of  the  oil  price  shocks  on  each  country's  economic  growth.  The 
number  of  observations  used  to  estimate  equation  (1)  is  30,3  observations 
for  a  total of  10  countries,  e~cept for  the  regressions  which  have  the  ta~ 
wedge  as  the  independent  fiscal  variable,  where  the  observations  are  24, 
since the  OECD  does  not  publish  the data  needed  to  calculate  the  wedge  for 
Belgium  and  Denmark.  The  hypothesis  embedded  in  equation  (1)  is  that  the 
slowdown  in  the  growth  rates  of  real  GDP  per  capita  and  of  employment  is 
significantly correlated with  the  growth  in  the  size of  the  government  and 
in the wedge. 
One  problem with estimating regression (1)  is reverse causation:  a 
recession  and  an  increase  in  unemployment  lead  to  higher  spending  on 
unemployment  benefits  and  to  increases  in  the  share  of  spending  on  other 
programs  in  GDP,  if  the  government  wants  to  maintain  the  growth  rate  of 
programs  unaltered.  However  by  taking  7  or 8  year  averages  the effect of 
short cycles on  the fiscal variables  should  be  small.  As  to  the  effect of 
long  cycles  it  can  be  assumed  that  within  a  long  period  such  as  7  or  8 
years,  governments  have  the  time  to  change,  at  least  to  some  extent,  the 
legislation and  adapt  expenditure  programs  and  taxes  to  the  new  lower rate 
of  economic  growth.  Thus  government  actions  may  reduce  the  reverse 
causation.  Furthermore  the  problem  of  reverse  causation  is  likely  to  be 
less  when  government  tax  receipts  or  the  tax  wedge  rether  than  government 
e~penditure are  used  as  the  exogenous  variable,  because  tax  revenues  fall 
during a  recession at unchanged  ta~ rates  and  because  governments  are more 
likely  to  reduce  ta~  rates  during  a  prolonged  recession  than  to  reduce 
government  spending.  Be  that  as  it may,  the  regression  results  reported 
below  have  to  be  taken  with  great  caution.  Further  work  is  required  in 
attempting  to  eliminate  the  effect  of  long  cyclical  swings  on  government 
e~penditures,  receipts  and  the  wedge  and  in  disaggregating  total 
e~penditure and  revenues  into major categories. 
The  regression results reported in Table  8  suggest  that  the growth 
rates  of  real  GDP  per  capita were  negatively  and  significantly correlated 
with  the  growth  in  government  expenditure,  in  ta~ation  and  in  the  wedge 
over  the  sample  period.  Particularly the  coefficient of  the  average  ratio 
of  tax  receipts  to  GDP  is significantly different  from  zero:  an  increase T
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in  the  average  ratio  of  tax  receipts  to  GDP  of  one  percentage  point  was 
associated  with  a  lower  average  annual  rate  of  growth  of  real  GDP  per 
capita  of  0.17  points.  An  increase  in  the  average  ratio  of  government 
e'tpenditure  to  GDP  of  one  percentage  point  was  associated  with  a  lower 
average  rate  of  growth  of  real  GDP  per  capita  of  0.11  points  per  annum. 
Also  the  two  tax  wedges  are  significantly  and  negatively  correlated  with 
the  rate of growth of both  GDP  per capita and  total employment. 
The  coefficients . of  the  other  two  independent  variables,  the 
average  ratio  of  e'tports  to  GDP  and  of  oil  imports  to  GDP  were  never 
significantly  different  from  zero.  However  especially  the  variable  used 
here  to measure  the oil dependence is very crude.  Furthermore if countries 
with  a  greater  dependence  on  oil  imports  have  tended  to  increase  the,  size 
of  government  relatively more  the coefficients of  the  previous  regres.sions 
could  be biased. 
Similar cross-country regressions of  the rate of growth of  GDP  per 
capita  on  the  changes  in  the  public  debt  to  GDP  ratio  could  not  be 
performed  because  of  the  difficult.ies  of  gathering  homogeneous  data  on 
public  debt  going  back  to  1960  for  ~a  sufficient  number  of countries.  The 
effect  of  the  public  debt  to  GDP  ratio  on  the  growt~ of  real  output  per 
capita  has,  however,  been  analysed  for  Germany  by  Sommariva  and  Tullio 
(1986a,  1986b),  by  taking  5  year  averages  over  the  period  1880  to  1979. 
During  this  period  the  ratio  of  public  debt  to  GDP  had  a  very  significant 
and  negative effect on  the growth rate of  GDP  per capita. 
A  significant  negative  correlation  between  the  tax/GDP  ratio  and 
the  growth  rate  of  real  GDP  has  also  been  found  for  a  sample  of  20 
developed  and  developing  countries  by Marsden  (1984)  using average data for 
the  1970s.  When  the rate of  growth  of  the  capital  stock and  of  the  labour 
force are added  to  the  tax/GDP  ratio as additional  independent variables in 
his  20-country  sample  the  size  of  the  coefficient  of  the  tax/GDP  ratio  is 
halved  and  it  looses  significance,  while  the  coefficient  of  the  rate  of 
growth  of  the  capital  stock  turns  out  to  be  very  high  and  significant. 
This  implies  that in his  sample of countries  tax increases  seem to have  had 
above  all  a  strong  negative  effect  on  capital  accumulation.  However  by 
disaggregating  tax receipts he also  shows  that there was  a  very significant 
and  negative  correlation between  the  growth  rate  of  the  labour  force  and 
social security payments  and  payroll  taxes. -18-
The  regressions  presented  in  this  section  and  those  performed  by 
Marsden  are  reduced  from  equations  and  do  not  by  themselves  establish  a 
causal relationship from  fiscal variables  to  economic  growth.  A structural· 
model  of  the  economy  comprising  a  wage  equation,  a  price  equation,  an 
investment  function and  a  demand  for  labour equation has  been estimated for 
Germany,  the  Netherlands,  the  US  and  the  United  Kingdom  by  Knoester 
(1983).  His  empirical  work  suggests  a  high degree  of  forward  tax shifting 
in the wage  equation,  a  significant crowding  out  of  private investment when 
public debts  and  interest rates  increase  and  a  high negative elasticity of 
the  demand  for  labour  with  respect  to  the  product  wage.  Simulations  of 
each  country  model  show  that  an  increase  in  government  expenditure  and 
taxation  leads  in  the  long  run  to  a  fall  in  employment  and  real  output  in 
all  4  countries.  Knoester' s  simulations  and  the  theoretical  arguments 
presented  in the next  sections  suggest a  significant causality running  from 
the  growth  of  government,  the  way  it  has  occurred  in  Europe,  to  lower 
employment  and  economic  growth. 
3.  The  determination of  wages  and  prices,  taxation and  the  demand  and  the 
supply of  labour 
A useful  starting  point  to  analyse  the  effect  of  higher  taxes  on 
wages,  prices,  the real product wage  and  employment  is Adam  Smith  and  David 
Ricardo's model.  Briefly their theory on  the consequences  of  the growth of 
government  expenditure  and  taxation  is  composed  of  three  major  points. 
a)  Taxes  upon  the  wages  of  labour,  taxes  upon  necessities  and,  in  part 
also,  taxes  on  luJturie~l  are  shifted  forward  more  or  less  fully  into 
higher  real  labour  costs.  Therefore  these  taxes  are  taxes  on  profits. 
b)  The  higher  real  cost  of  labour  leads  to  a  reduction  in  the  demand  for 
labour  by  the  private  sector,  for  a  given  capital  stock.  But  since in the 
long  run  the capital stock falls,  (see  point  c  below),  the reduction in the 
demand  for  labour  will  be  even  larger.  c)  In  an  open  economy  taxes  on 
profits  cause  an  outflow  of  capital  until  the  after  tax  profit  rate  is 
again equalized across countries;  in a  closed  economy  the adjustment occurs 
via a  reduction in capital accumulation.  ~nee the  reduction in employment 
in  the  private  sector  and  the  reduction  in  capital  accumulation  cause 
deindustrialisation. 
(1)  According  to  Adam  Smith  labourers  also  consumed  luxuries.  But  since 
they  consumed  little of  them  the effect of  an  indirect  taJC  on  luxuries 
on  the cost of  labour  to  firms  was  assumed  to be small. - 19-
Smith  and  Ricardo's  model  is generally quickly  dismissed  today  on 
the  basis  of  the  argument  that  two  of  their key  assumptions  are  no  longer 
valid.  These  assumptions  are  the  subsistance  theory  of  wages  and  the 
belief  that  government  expend! ture  had  no  value  for  the  average  citizen, 
since  it  was  wasted  on  wars  or  to  maintain  kings'  and  princes'  lavish 
standards  of  living.  Yet,  their  thorough  analysis  contains  a  number  of 
elements  which  deserve very close  scrutiny because  they are still relevant 
to understand  the consequence  of  the  growth of government  in Europe. 
How  the  conclusions  derived  from  Smith  and  Ricardo's  model  can  be 
changed  by  the  possibility  that  the  government  spends  its  receipts  on 
productive  investment  or  on  goods,  services  and  transfers  that  are  valued 
highly  by  the  citizen-voter-taxpayer  rather  than  on  wasteful  wars,  is 
analysed  in the next sections.  In this section the  likely effect of higher 
taxation  in  Europe  on  wages,  prices,  the  product  wage  and  the  demand  for 
labour  is  analysed,  drawing  upon  existing  empirical  evidence  on  the 
functioning of  labour markets  in Europe. 
The  subsistance  theory of wages  is clearly outdated as a  theory of 
real wage  behaviour  in modern  industrial countries.  But  if real after tax 
wages  are  rigid  downwards  because  labour  unions  possess  some  degree 
of  monopoly  power  and/or  because  workers  resist  real  wage  reductions 
because  they  do  not  value  the  addi  tiona!  government  expend!  ture  highly 
enough,  the  conclusions  of  Smith  and  Ricardo's  model  still  maintain 
historical  relevance  to  understand  today's  European  macroeconomic 
problems.  The  determination  of  nominal  wages  has  to  be  analysed  jointly 
with  the  determination  of  prices  by  firms.  The  workers  or  labour  unions 
who  attempt  to  shift  the  higher  taxes  forward  may  be  frustrated  if  firms 
can pass  the higher labour costs onto higher  product  prices.  But  the  firms 
freedom  in  setting  prices  has  been  limited  in  Europe  by  the  high  and 
increasing  openess  of  the  European  economies  and,  at  least  since  the  mid-
seventies,  by  the  anti-inflationary  policies  of  the  governments  of  the 
major  industrial  countries.  However  the  high  and  increasing  openess  has 
probably been  ·the more  important factor,  as  the real cost of  labour 
and  taxation  were  developing  quite  differently  or  starting  from  very 
different  levels  in  other  major  areas  of  the  world,  such  as  the  newly 
industrialised countries,  Japan  and  the  United  States. -20-
Where  the monopoly  power  of unions is greater,  or where  government 
expenditure has  gone  beyond  the optimum level,  the adjustment  to  the growth 
of government  expenditure  will be borne more  by  reduced  employment  than by 
reduced net wages  and  the political pressure on  the government  to roll back 
the growth in expenditure will be less since the employed  worker's net wage 
is  prevented  from  falling.  Vice  versa,  where  the  degree  of  monopoly  power 
of  unions  is less  and  the  size  of  government  below  the  optimum,  net  wages 
tend  to  fall  and  the  political  pressure  to  roll  back  the  growth  in 
government  builds up  more  rapidly.  This  could  explain why  in  the  US  there 
seems  to be  a  much  broader political consensus  than in Europe  to reduce  the 
size  of  government,  despite  the  fact  that  growth  of  government  in  the  US 
has  been  much  more  moderate  in  the  period  under  study.  This  analysis 
implies  therefore  that  in  Europe  there  may  be  or  have  been  dangerous 
elements  of  instability:  the  more  government  expenditure  grows  beyond  the 
optimum,  the  more  labour  unions  resist  reductions  in  net  wages,  the  more 
employment  falls,  without  sufficient  political  pressure  building  up  to 
reduce  the  size  of  government.  It  might  therefore  be  necessary  that 
enlightened  governments,  who  can  perceive  the  links  outlined  above,  pursue 
the objective of rolling back  the size of government  in Europe  even without 
a  clear  mandate  from  the  worker-voter  to  that  effect.  On  the  other  hand 
the  greater  antagonism  toward  government  spending  in  the  US  may  come 
largely from  defence  spending,  where  many  people  in the  US  feel that Europe 
and  Japan  receive  most  of  the  benefits  rather  than  the  American  taxpayers. 
In  contrast,  in  Europe  domestic  citizens directly  receive  the  benefits  of 
most  government  spend~ng(1). 
The  degree  of  forward  shifting  of  taxation  onto  higher  product 
wages  and  the  negative  impact  of  higher  product  wages  on  employment  in 
Europe  in the  period  under  analysis,  two  crucial links  in the  transmission 
from  higher  taxation  to  lower  employment,  have  so  far  been  assumed  on  the 
basis of circumstantial evidence. 
On  the  issue  of  the  degree  of  forward  shifting  of  taxation, 
Knoester  (1983)  and  Knoester  and  Van  der  Windt  (1985)  suggest  that it has 
been  significant  and  substantial  in  OECD  countries  in  the  period  under 
(1)  This  point was  suggested by Robert  Gordon. \ 
-21-
analysis. ( 1)  They  tested  for  the  forward  shifting  of  the  sum  of  direct 
taxation  of  labour  and  social  security  contributions,  leaving  aside  the 
inflation tax on  monetary and  financial assets which  for  some  years and  for 
some  countries  has  been  quite  substantial{2).  As  to  the  degree  of  forward 
shifting  of  indirect  ta-,ces  they  include  the  difference  between  consumer 
price  changes  and  GDP  price  changes  among  the  independent  variables.  To 
what  e-,ctent  this difference is determined  by  the  behaviour  of  the  terms  of 
trade  in  addition  to  changes  in  indirect  taxation  is  however  not  clear. 
For several countries  they  found  full  forward  shifting of  the  sum  of direct 
taxation  and  social  security  contributions.  It  would  be  interesting  to 
split  the  sample  period  and  see  whether,  say  after  1973,  the  degree  of 
shifting  forward  in  Europe  has  been  higher  than  before,  as  one  would 
expect,  and  if in the  US  and  Japan it has  been  significantly lower  than  in 
Europe.  Preliminary work  by Tullio  (1986)  shows  that the degree of  forward 
shifting in the  US  has  been significantly lower  for direct taxation and  for 
total  social  security  contributions  than  in  European  countries.  In  this 
study  nominal  labour  costs  are  ~egressed on  a  deflator  of  GDP  at  market 
prices as well as  productivity and  tax variables.  Since  the coefficient of 
the price inde-,c  turns out not  to be  significantly different  from  one  in all 
eight  industrial  countries  in  the  sample,  the  regressions  measure  the 
average effect of  productivity  growth  and  tax  factors  on  the  real  product 
wage.  Hence  the  actual  behaviour  of  prices  during  the  sample  period  is 
implicitly taken into  account  although  a  better way  to  proceed  would  be  to 
estimate  simultaneously a  wage  and  a  price  equation  for  each  country.  For 
the  US  Gordon  (1971)  finds  a  very  high  and  significant coefficient  of  the 
rate  of  change  of  the  employers'  social  security  ta-,c  rate  in  wage 
equations.  His  estimates of  the coefficients range  from  about  0.70  to  1.10 
for  the  period  from  the  first quarter  of  1954  to  the last quarter of  1970. 
He  estimates  also  the  coefficients  of  the  changes  in  the  employees'  ta-,c 
rate and  finds  that  they are much  smaller,  ranging  from  about  0.14  to about 
(1)  Knoester's  sample  period  is  1958-1980  and  Knoester  and  Van  der  Windt's 
1960-1982. 
(2)  See  Masera  (1979)  for  an  estimate  of  the  inflation tax in Italy in the 
1970s.  He  shows  that  in  1976  the  inflation  tax  was  higher  than  the 
direct  ta-,cation  of all wage  income. -22-
0.24,  but  still  very  significantly  different  from  zero  (Gordon,  1971, 
1972).  Hamermesh  (1981)  shows  that  the shifting forward  of direct taxation 
and  social security contributions has  significantly raised the natural rate 
of  unemployment  in the us. 
Empirical  evidence  on  the  second  crucial  link in  the  transmission 
from  higher  taxation  to  lower  employment,  the elasticity of  the demand  for 
labour with respect  to  the  product wage,  is instead relatively abundant.  A 
negative  long  run  partial elasticity of  the  demand  for  labour with respect 
to  the  real  product  wage  by  profit  maximizing  firms  follows  from  any 
production  function  with a  non  zero elasticity substitution between  labour 
and  capital.  The  Cobb-Douglas  production  function  for  example  assumes  a 
long  run  elasticity  of  -1.  In  empirical  work  the  long  run  elasticity of 
labour demand  has  been  shown  not  to  be  significantly different  from  -1  for 
Germany  by  Sommariva  and  Tullio  (1985)  for Australia by  the Federal Reserve 
Bank  of Australia econometric model  (1977),  for Italy by Tullio  (1981),  and 
for  Sweden  by  HHrngreen,  Myhrman  et  al.  (1982).(1)  Artus  (1984)  using  a 
CES  production  function,  shows  that  for  the  post  World  War  II  German 
manufacturing  sector  the  CES  production  function  reduces  to  a  Cobb-Douglas 
and  implicitly  that  the  partial  elasticity  is  -1.  The  COMPACT  model 
estimated  by  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  for  the  aggregate 
of  the  Connnuni ty  also  implies  an  elasticity  of  about  -1.  With  a  CES 
production  function  the  absolute  value  of  the  elasticity can  be  larger or 
smaller  than  one  depending  on  the  value  of  the  elasticity of  substitution 
between  labour  and  capital.  Using  Wymer's  (1972,  1976)  maximum  likelihood 
estimation  procedures  to ·estimate  small  macromodels,  Bergerstrom  and  Wymer 
(1976)  and  Knight  and  Wymer  (1978)  obtained  an  elasticity of -o.s  for  the 
UK,  and  Sommariva  (1981)  obtained  an  elasticity of  -0.44  for  Sweden.  All 
the  studies  mentioned  above  are  done  on  postwar  data  except  Sommariva  and 
Tullio  (1986)  which  covers  100  years  from  1880  to  1979.  A  high  and 
significantly negative elasticity is also  found  by Knoester  (1983)  for  the 
Netherlands,  Germany,  the  US  and  the  UK. 
(1)  These elasticities are obtained within small macroeconomic  models esti-
mated  by  full information maximum  likelihood using Wymer's  (1972,  1976) 
programs.  They  are  more  reliable  and  accurate  than  the  ones  obtained 
from  single equation estimates  because  they are  free  from  the  simulta-
neous  equation  bias.  They  are  obtained  by  imposing  across  equations 
restrictions on  the price, wage,  employment  and  investment  functions. -23-
Dr~ze and  Modigliani  (1980)  obtain a  short  run partial elasticity 
of  Belgian  employment  with  respect  to  real  wages  of  -o.2.  They  also  show 
that  if capacity is  allowed  to  adjust,  the  elasticity  becomes  a  sizeable 
-2.0  for  Belgium.  Their  conclusions are  based  on  the  model  of the Belgian 
Planning  Office  estimated  by  d'Alcantara  (1979).  Dr~ze  (1984)  reviews 
developments  of  the capital  labour  ratio and  of  factor  shares  in Europe  in 
the  1970s  and  concludes  that  the  evidence  is  not  inconsistent  with  the 
hypothesis  that  the  underlying  production  function  is  Cobb-Douglas.  A 
recent study by  the  UK  Treasury  reviews  empirical  estimates  of  the elasti-
city for  the  United Kingdom  and  concludes  that most  studies find  an elasti-
city varying between  -1  and  -1/2 with output  allowed  to  vary  (UK  Treasury, 
1985).  The  study  points  out  that  these  estimates  could  be  biased  towards 
zero  if in  some  years  of  the  sample  period  there  were  labour  supply  con-
straints.  In  a  study focusing  on  factors  determining  income  shares in the 
European  Community,  Steinherr  (1983)  finds  that  in  most  countries  firms 
resisted  the  reduction  in  profit  margins  arising  from  higher  input  and 
labour costs  by  shedding  labour.  The  elasticities obtained  by  the  various 
authors  are  not  always  strictly comparable  because  in  some  studies  output 
is  fi-xed  while  in  others  it is  variable,  and  because  some  estimates  are 
model  based while others result from  single equations. 
Government  employment  policies  in  the  face  of  increases  in  wage 
costs  and  the  possible  reductions  in private  employment  are crucial  in the 
determination of  the final outcome.  If the government directly employs  the 
labourers  laid off  by  the  private  sector and  increases  further  ta-xation to 
keep  the  budget  in balance  the  danger  of  a  vicious  circle arises  in which 
government  employment  grows  and,  as a  result of higher  ta-xation,  employment 
in the private sector is reduced  further.(1)  This  has  happened  to a  large 
e"Xtent  in Sweden  where  the government  has  a  very pronounced  full employment 
objective. 
The  interaction between  the  reduction  in  the  demand  for  labour  in 
the  private  sector  and  increases  in government  employment  and  the  size  of 
(1)  See  in particular SHderstrom and  Viotti  (1978)  and  Steinherr (1983). -24-
government  and  ta~ation  have  been  studied  with  reference  to  the  Swedish 
case  at  the  University  of  Stockholm  (Calmfors  and  Horn,  1983,  StSderstrom 
and  Viotti,  1978,  and  Gylfason and  Lindbeck,  1982).  In particular Gylfasort 
and  Lindbeck  study  the  problem  in a  game  theoretic  framework  and  show  that 
if  the  government  reacts  to  the  fall  in  private  employment  the  size  of 
government  will  be  higher  and  private  employment  smaller  than  otherwise. 
The  Stockholm  school  seems  to  suggest  that  the  processes  described  above 
were  set  in motion  by  exogenous  increases  in real  wages.  However  it seems 
more  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  process  was  set  in motion  in  Sweden  by 
an  exogenous  e~pansion of  government  e~penditure in the  1960s.(1)  Bacon  and 
Eltis  (1976)  follow a  partially classical approach and  introduce profit and 
capital  accumulation  in  the  analysis  of  the  effects  on  economic  growth  of 
the  reduction  in  the  share  of  output  which  is  "marketed"  resulting  from 
increased  government  employment.  They  consider  the  possibility  of 
unemployment  developing  if workers  have  minimum  targets  of  consumption  of 
marketed  output and/or  labour unions  possess monopoly  power. 
What  is the role played by  the elasticity of  supply of  labour with 
respect  to  the  after  tax  wage  in causing  a  fall  in employment?  With  full 
shifting forward  of  ta~ation on  the  part  of  the  labour  unions  and  workers, 
the  previous  analysis  suggests  that  firms  reduce  employment  as  labour 
costs  increase.  The  elasticity of  supply  of  labour  plays  no  role.  If  the 
incidence  of  labour  ta~es is borne  instead  by  wage  earners,  the adjustment 
in  employment  occurs  on  the  supply  of  labour  side  (Break,  1974).  The 
elasticity  of  demand  for  labour  would  appear  to  play  a  relatively larger 
role in European  economies  with respect  to  the  US  economy  possibly  because 
labour  unions  have  more  monopoly  power  and  because  the  size of  government 
exceeds  by  far  the  US  levels. 
Empirical  evidence  on  the  elasticity  of  supply  of  labour  is 
becoming  more  plentiful for  the  UK  and  the  US  economies.  The  elasticity of 
supply  of  labour  services  by  principal  family  income  recipients  is 
generally believed  to  be  negligible.  For  married  women  the  elasticity is 
generally  believed  to  be  substantially higher.  One  factor  which  has  most 
likely had  a  more  important  effect  on  the  supply  of  labour  in Europe  than 
(1)  The  growth  of  government  expenditure  in  Sweden  exceeded  by  far  that  in 
other major  European  industrial countries in the  1960s. --25-
in  the  US  is  the  level  of  unemployment  compensation  (Balassa,  1984,  OECD, 
1985).  However,  even in the  US  the secular growth  of  unemployment  benefits 
has  significantly  affected  the  natural  rate  of  unemployment  (Collyns, 
1984).  As  in  many  European  countries  unemployment  benefits  are  barely 
below  the  level  of net  wages  for  a  prolonged  period  of  time  after  layoff, 
there  is  no  incentive  to  find  new  employment.  If  the  workers  can  supply 
their  services  in  the  hidden  economy,  as  they  do  in  many  countries,  they 
can  end  up  being  better  off  financially  by  remaining  registered  as 
unemployed.  Similarly,  the  improvement  and  extension  of  old  age  pension 
schemes  seems  to  have  reduced  the  participation  rate  of  older  people  and 
sickness  benefits  seem  to  have  increased  absenteeism,  especially in  Sweden 
and  Ireland  (OECD,  1985).(1) 
With  shifting  forward  of  taxes  on  labour,  profits are  squeezed  in 
the  short  run  especially  in  open  economies  which  face  strong  foreign 
competition.  Only  as  firms  manage  to reduce  the size of their labour  force 
can  profits  partly  recover.  For  the  average  of  the  1970's  the  gross 
operating surplus in manufacturing as a  ratio of gross value added,  a  proxy 
of  profit  margins,  was  below  the  level of  the  1960s  in  the  four  large  EEC 
countries  (Mortensen,  1984  and  OECD  1986).  However,  the  oil  shock  also 
contributed  to  this  development.  Since  1981  the  gross  operating  surplus 
has  increased  steadily,  despite  sluggish  demand,  as  firms  were  reducing 
their  labour  force  in  absolute  terms  and  in  relation  to  their  capital 
stock.  Table  9  contains  the  gross  operating  surplus  as  a  percentage  of 
value  added  in  the  four  larg~  European  countries,  Sweden,  the  US  and 
Japan.  Despite  the  reduction of  employment,  in  1983  the  simple  average  of 
the  gross  operating  surplus  as  a  percent  of  value  added  was  still 18.4  per 
cent below the average of  the  1960s  in the four  largest European countries, 
while  in the United  States it was  only 7  per cent lower. 
1  PP•  140-142,  PP•  147-152  and  PP•  152-153. -26-
Table 9:  Gross operating  surplus in manufacturing,  1960-1983 
(as a  ratio of value added) 
1960s  1970s  1982  1983(1) 
average  average 
Germany  36,3  30,7  26,6  29,5 
France  33,3  32,3  25,1  27,0 
UK  32,2  23,6  21,5  24,5 
Italy  39,4  32,7  35,3  34,2 
Sweden  29,6  22,7  23,7  29,9 
USA  27,1  24,9  21,1  25,2 
Japan  55,9  47,6  44,3  44,0 
(1)  Estimate 
Source:  OECD(1986) -27-
4.  The  importance  of  how  workers  value  government  expenditure  for  the 
degree of tax shifting. 
Stripping  the  problem  to  its  bare  bones,  the  importance  of  how 
public  expenditure  is  valued  by  the  worker-voter-taxpayer  for  wage  be-
haviour can be illustrated with the help of Figure  11 
Figure  1  - Costs  and  Benefits  of  government  e-x:pendi ture  and  the  optimal 
size of government 
p 
X 
On  the  horizontal  a-x:is  -x:  indicates  the  quantity  of  public output  (a  pro-x:y 
could  be  real  government  e-x:penditure)  per  capita.  On  the  vertical  a-x:is  p 
indicates  the  number  of  units  of  domestic  currency.  National  product  and 
the  general  price  level are  assumed  to  be  constant.  The  c(-x:;~)  curve  is  a 
supply  curve  of  output  on  the  part  of  the  government.  It  indicates  the 
social costs  which  the  government  incurs  to  supply  a  given  quantity  of  x. 
These  costs  include  the  direct  costs  the  government  incurs  to  supply  the 
public  goods  plus  the  indirect  costs  connected  with  the  misallocation  of 
resources which-government  e-x:penditure  and  taxation cause.  These  costs are 
1  See  Inman  (1982). -28-
measured  in units  of  domestic  currency  and  they  increase  as  the  supply  of 
public  output  increase,  partly for  the  same  reasons  as  the  supply curve of 
the  output  of  any  industry  is  generally  upward  sloping  and  partly  for 
reasons  that  are  peculiar  to  it.  The  government  specific "factors" which 
causes  the  supply  curve  c(~,~)  to  be  upward  sloping  are  connected with  the 
costs  of  collecting  ta~es  and  with  the  increasing  misallocation  of 
resources  caused  by  higher  average  and  marginal  ta~ation  and  higher 
government  e~penditure(l).  ~  stands  for  all  factors  other  than  the 
quantity of  public output  that  influence costs.  They  include  the structure 
of  government  taxation  and  e~penditure  which  influences  the  e~tent  of 
'resource  misallocations  as  well  as  the  disincentive  effects  of  existing 
marginal  ta~ rates.  In principle the curve  c(~,~) could also be u-shaped 
due  to  economies  of scale before diseconomies  set in. 
The  downward  sloping curve  labelled  b(~;9) is the marginal benefit 
curve  (demand  curve)  for  government  output  of  the  worker-voter-taxpayer. 
it  indicates  how  much  they  are  willing  to  pay  for  any  given  quantity  of 
government  output.  The  symbol  7  stands  for all factors other than  ~ which 
influence  the value which  the worker attributes  to government  output.  They 
include  the  structure  of  government  expenditure  and  their  quality.  Given 
the  position  of  the  cost  and  benefit  curves  of  figure  1,  the  optimum  size 
of  government  is  reached  at  point  A,  where  ~  is  equal  to  ~.  if  ~ 
e~ceeds  x0  the  marginal  cost  of  production  of  public  output  e~ceeds  the 
marginal benefit and  vice versa when  ~ is below x0 • 
Smith  and  Ricardo's  model  implies  a  steeply  declining  b(x; 'J  ) 
curve which intersects the horizontal axis at quite  a  low  level of  x  after 
which  the  benefit  of  additional  government  output  to  the  citizens  of  the 
country  would  be  zero  or  negative.  It  follows  that  the  optimal  size  of 
government  is reached at a  low  level of x. 
( 1)  They  are  mainly  distortions  of  the  labour-leisure  and  consumption-
saving  choice,  distortions  caused  by differential  ta~ation on  commodi-
ties  and  tariffs  on  imports,  misallocation  effects  due  to  subsidies, 
unemployment  compensations  and  other government  e~penditure. -29-
Assuming  the  size  of  government  is  initially  below  the  optimum 
and  that net  of  tax wages  are initially above  the  subsistence level,  there 
is  likely  to  be  no  wage  resistance  on  the  part  of  workers  as  government 
grows  until  point  A  is  reached.  If  the  size  of  government  grows  beyond 
point  A  one  would  expect  workers  to  start  resisting  further  taxation 
increases  by  refusing  to accept a  cut in real net of  tax wages.  The  reason 
being  that  beyond  point  A they feel  that  they  pay  more  than  what  they  get 
in exchange  for  the higher taxation. 
It is impossible  to know  the  shape of  the  curves  c(x;~) and  b(x;/) 
and  therefore  to  determine  a  priori  the  optimum  size  of  government,  or 
whether  a  country's government  expenditure  per capita is above  or below the 
optimal  level  (given  the  structure  of  taxation  and  the  composition  of 
government  e-,cpenditure).  However,  there  is  a  presumption  that  Europe's 
total government  outlays  have  surpassed  sometime  between  1960  and  today  the 
optimum  level.  The  presumption arises  from  the  actual  behaviour  of  wages, 
employment  and  unemployment  in  Europe  analysed  in  Section  2.  European 
governments  were  unable  to  convince  the  worker-taxpayer  not  to  shift 
forward  the  increased  taxation  and  social  security  contributions  and  to 
accept  the necessary  cuts  or  lower  growth  of  net  wages.  In many  industrial 
countries  government  expenditure  grew  considerably  as  a  ratio  to  national 
product also during  the gold  standard.  The  relevant ratios for  Germany  are 
reported  in Table  1  of  Appendi-,c  1.  An  historical analysis of  the  behaviour 
of  the  key  macroeconomic  variables  in  Germany  from  1880  to  1979  seems  to 
suggest  that  the  growth  of  government  and  ta-,cation  which  occurred  before 
World  War  I  was  absorbed  by  the  private sector without  strains.(1) 
Even  assuming  that 
established  that  the  levels 
for  a  given  country  it  could  be  clearly 
of  the  main  macroeconomic  variables  are 
incompatible  with  each other  because  the  government  has  grown  too  much,  it 
does  not  necessarily  follow  that  the  only  way  to  return  to  macroeconomic 
equilibrium  is  to  reduce  the  size  of  the  public  sector  in  relation  to 
national  product.  The  government  could  enact  policies  that  shift  the 
c(-,c;~)  curve  down  and/or  the  b(x; 7)  curve  up.  The  c(x;~)  curve  can  be 
(1)  See  Sommariva  and  Tullio  (1986),  Chapter I. -30-
shifted  downwards  by  changing  the  structure  of  taxation  and  government 
expenditure  in  the  direction  of  a  less  distortive  mix  and  by  reducing 
marginal  tax  rates  for  a  given  tax  intake,  by  increasing  the  level  of 
efficiency  in  the  government  in  supplying  public  output  and  by  reducing 
corruption.  The  b(x; 9 )  curve  can  be  shifted  upwards  by  supplying  goods 
which  are  more  highly  valued  by  the  worker.  Alternatively  governments 
could  attempt  to  reduce  the  degree  of  monopoly  power  of  labour  unions  in 
order  to  reduce  the after tax product wage. 
Labour  unions  in Europe are generally believed to be  supportive of 
the  idea  of  having  more  government  and  more  public  employment  programmes, 
especially when  unemployment  is high.  They  also  want  high real  wages  for 
their  members.  It  follows  from  the  analysis  of  this  section  that  labour 
unions  in  Europe  have  failed  to  see  that  more  government  requires  less 
growth  of  real  after  tax  wages  or  even  declining real after  tax wages,  if 
macroeconomic  equilibrium is to be maintained in the long run. 
s.  Effects of  the  growth of  government  expenditure and  taxation on savings 
and  capital accumulation. 
So  far  the  paper  has  focused  on  the  effect  of  the  growth  of 
government  expenditure and  taxation which has occurred in Europe  since 1960 
on  wages,  prices,  the  function  of  the  labour  market  and  employment.  This 
section  will  briefly  analyse  the  effects  of  government  expenditure  and 
taxation  on  savings  and  capital  accumulation.  A  survey  on  the effects of 
the  growth of  the  US  government  on  capital formation by Von  Furstenberg and 
Malkeil  (1977)  concludes  that  overall  the  net  effect  was  most  likely 
negative;  the  authors  distinguish  three  types  of  financing  of  government 
expenditure:  taxation,  inflation  and  bond  financing.  Even  though  the 
inflation  tax  has  been  a  relevant  source  of  government  finance  for  some 
countries(1)  the  latter  has  been  the  least  important  of  the  three  sources 
ofgovernment  revenues  for Europe  as a  whole.  For most  countries by far  the 
most  important  source of  revenue was  taxation followed  by bond  financing. 
(1)  Particularly Italy in 1974,  1976  and  1980  and  the  UK  in 1974  and  1976. -31-
On  the  expenditure  side  they distinguish  between  direct  purchases 
of  goods  and  services,  transfers  and  expenditure  on  capital  account. 
Transfers  have  been by  far  the most  dynamic  item on  the expenditure side in 
all industrial countries within and  outside the EC.  Expenditure  on  capital 
account has  increased substantially as  a  ratio  to  GDP  from  1960  to  1983  in 
Japan  and  Italy and  has  remained  stable or  has  declined  in the other major 
industrial  countries,  particularly  since  1975,  since it was  easier  to  cut 
than transfers.  Even  in Japan and  Italy the expenditure  on  capital account 
has  fallen  in  relation  to  overall  government  expenditure.  Table  10 
contains  the  ratios  of  expenditure  on  capital  account  to  GDP/GNP  in  five 
year intervals from  1960  to  1980  and  in  1982  in  the  big  four  EC  countries, 
in Japan  and  in  the  US.  The  lower  part  of  the  table contains  the ratio of 
expenditure on  capital account  to total government  expenditure.  Government 
expenditure  on  capital account  in Table  10  contain  investment  subsidies  to 
the  private  sector and  subscription of  capital of  public  enterprises which 
in many  European  countries  have  often  covered  operating  losses.  Thus  the 
figure  indicated  in  the  table  most  likely  overestimates  at  least  for 
European  countries  the  contribution  of  the  government  to  the  country's 
capital stock. 
The  distinction between  three  types of  financing methods  and  three 
types of expenditure gives rise to  9  possible combinations.  The  effects on 
capital  accumulation  are  likely  to  be  quite  different  in  each  case. 
Economic  theory does  not generally permit  firm conclusions  to  be  reached. 
Particularly difficult is the assessment  of  the effect on  household  savings 
of  specific  welfare  programmes,  like  the  expansion  of  unemployment 
compensations,  of medical care and  pension systems.  Another controversial 
issue  relating  to  the  effects  of  bond  financing,  is  the  extent  to  which 
government  bonds  are  net  wealth.  If  government  bonds  are  not  considered 
net  wealth  and  people  discount  future  tax  liabilities,  the  effect  of  bond 
financing  on  capital accumulation will  be  less negative.  Martin  Feldstein 
(1982)  has  analysed  the  effects  of  government  policy  on  consumer 
expenditure for  the United  States and  shown  that the marginal  propensity to 
consume  out  of  transfers  is  significantly  higher  than  1.  He  also  shows 
that  a  constructed  measure  of  social  security wealth  has  a  significant and T
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positive  effect  on  consumer  expenditure  (1974,  1982)  with  a  coefficient 
which  is  not  significantly  different  from  that  of  overall  wealth  which 
includes  the  value  of  the  public  debt.  Both  findings  suggest  that,  at 
least  for  the  United  States,  the  effect  of  the  growth  of  social  security 
payments,  of  social  security  wealth  and  of  public  debt  have  had  negative 
effects  on  capital accumulation.  Furthermore  they  strongly contradict  the 
hypothesis  rediscovered  by  Bailey  (1962)  and  Barro  (1974)  that  government 
bonds  are not  net  wealth.  If the  conclusions  reached  by  Feldstein for  the 
US  are  applicable  to  European  countries,  the  large  increase  in  transfers 
observeq  in Europe  is likely to have  exerted a  considerably negative effect 
on capital accumulation. 
In  the  remainder  of  this  section  two  of  the  nine  combinations  of 
growth  in  e-,cpenditure-financing  will  be  considered  in  greater  detail  and 
the  channels  through  which  they  may  affect  capital  accumulation  will  be 
analysed.  The  two  combinations  are  those  which  have  been  quantitatively 
the most  important in Europe  during  the  sample  period;  they are  the  tax and 
the  bond  tinanced  increases in transfers. 
Taking  up  the  ta-,c  financed  increase  in  transfers  first,  four 
channels  can  be  distinguished.  The  first  channel  operates  via  changes  in 
disposable  income  of  households.  Taxes  reduce  disposable  income,  while 
transfers  increase  it.  The  net  effect  on  disposable  income  is  negative 
because  of  the administration costs  of  transfer  programs,  because  the  cash 
equivalent  income  of  transfers  in kind  to  recipients  is generally  smaller 
than  the  reduction  in  income  of  ta-,c  payers  and  because  of  disincentive 
effects of  ta-,ces  and  transfers.  Furthermore aggregate household  savings is 
likely to  go  down  also  because  ta-,cpayers  have  a  higher  marginal  propensity 
to  save  than  transfer  recipients.  The  reduction  in  aggregate  household 
saving via changes  in disposable  income  is probably much  higher in the case 
of  a  ta-,c  financed  increase  in  government  purchases  of  goods  and  services 
than in the case considered here. -34-
The  second  channel  operates  via  the  reduction  in  after  tax 
interest  rates  and  the  effect  of  changes  in  after  tax  interest  rates  on 
saving.  It  is  still  debated  in  the  literature  whether  saving  depends 
positively and  significantly on  the real after tax interest rate.  Recently 
the conclusion  that  the  real after  tax interest rate has  uncertain effects 
on  private  savings  has  been  challenged  on  theoretical  grounds  by  Summers 
(1982,  1984)  in  a  model  of  the  life cycle  theory  of  savings.  He  argues 
that  there  is  a  very  strong  presumption  in  favour  of  a  positive 
elasticity.  His  empirical  estimates  confirm his  a-priori.  Most  existing 
empirical estimates of  the interest elasticity of  saving have  been obtained 
without  correcting  for  inflation  or  for  taxation.  Further  the  sample 
periods  do  not  generally  include  the  years  from  1980  to  1985  when  real 
interest  rates  underwent  major  fluctuations  and  rose  to  historically  high 
levels.(1)  Nevertheless  several  studies  suggest  that  the elasticity might 
be  quite  high.  Baskin  (1978),  for  example,  using  US  time  series  finds  a 
negative  real  after  tax  interest  rate  elasticity  of  consumption  of  about 
-0.4.  Baskin's  estimates  of  the  elasticity  could  be  somewhat  on  the  high 
side,  and  they  are  very  sensitive  to  the  inclusion  of  1934  in  the  sample 
period,  as  shown  by  Howry  and  Hymans  ( 1978) •  However,  even  smaller 
elasticities  would  imply  non  negligible  negative  effects  of  increased 
taxation  on  the  stock  of  capital  in  the  long  run.  Tullio  (1983)  for 
Germany  finds  a  positive  and  significant  real  interest  rate  elasticity of 
saving  of  0.01.  These  results  for  Germany  are  confirmed  by  recent 
estimates  of  the  consumption  function covering  the  period  from  1970  to  1983 
by  Tullio  and  Contesso  ,( 1985)  which  yield  an  after  tax  nominal  interest 
(1)  If real after tax interest rates influence savings but  they change very 
little it is more  difficult  to  obtain  a  significant elasticity.  This 
point is also made  by Summers  (1984). -35-
elasticity of  consumption  of  - 0.056.(1)  The  same  study  yields  high  and 
very  significant  after  ta~  interest  elasticities  for  all  other  major 
industrial  countries  in  the  sample.  A  pooled  cross-country  time  series 
estimate  (for  8  industrial  countries  and  from  1970  to  1983)  yields  an 
estimate  of  -0.034.  It  is  also  shown  that  for  most  countries  the 
elasticity  became  larger  and  more  significant  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
sample  period when  after  ta~ interest rate variability was  higher. 
Tullio  and  Contesso  also  split  the  after  ta~ interest  rate  into 
the before  ta~ rate  and  the  ta~ correction factor  and  find  that  the  latter 
is also very significant.  Rough  simulations with  the calculated elasticity 
show  that  the  increase  in  the  level  of  ta~ation which  occurred  after  1970 
led,  via  the  interest  rate  effect,  to  a  higher  level  of  1983  consumption 
per  capita  of  4.8  per  cent  in  Italy,  3.3  in  Belgium  and  2.0  in  Sweden. 
This  is equivalent  to a  lower  level of  1983  household  saving per capita of 
32.7  per cent in Italy,  22.6  in Belgium and  13.9  in Sweden. 
Gylfason  (1981)  also  finds  high  and  significant  elasticities  of 
consumption  for  the  US  both  with  respect  to  the  nominal  interest  rate  and 
with  respect  to  e~pected  inflation  by  trying  with  various  interest  rates 
and  various measures  of expected inflation. 
The  third  channel  operates  via  changes  in  the  demand  for  capital 
or  labour  intensive  goods.  Von  FUrstenberg  and  Malkiel  (1977)  maintain 
that  a  growth  in  transfers  changes  the  composition  of  aggregate  demand 
towards  more  capital  intensive  goods.  This  raises  the  rental  cost  of 
capital services and  reduces  the capital-labour ratio in all sectors of  the 
economy. 
Fourth,  welfare  programmes  and  especially  government  retirement 
programmes  may  have  specific  negative  effects  on  household  saving. 
Precautionary  saving  of  households  may  go  down  as  a  result  of  the 
introduction and  extension of unemployment  benefits,  free medical care,  and 
(1)  An  elasticity of  -0.06  implies  that  a  fall  in  the  after  tax  interest 
rate  from  say  4  per  cent  to  2  per  cent  which  corresponds  to  a  50  per 
cent decline,  raises consumption by a  substantial amount,  2.8 per cent. -36-
support  programmes  of  the  poor,  because  households  with high  probabilities 
to  experience unemployment,  disabilities,  illnesses may  feei more  protected 
and  save  less.  As  regards  government  pension  schemes,  if  the  actuarial 
present value of social security benefits is greater  than  the present value 
of  social  security  contributions  net  household  wealth  increases  and  con-
sumption  may  go  up  and  savings  down.  As  mentioned  above  Feldstein  (1974, 
1982)  estimated  for  the  US  that  the  marginal  propensity  to  consume  social 
security wealth does  not differ greatly  from  that  of  ordinary wealth.  TWo 
additional  factors  would  tend  to  depress  national  savings.  First,  the 
progressive  redistribution  built  into  the  pension  systems  contributes  to 
depress  saving.  Second,  in many  European  countries  where  social  security 
systems  are  not  ac tuarially  funded,  yearly  social  security  benefits  have 
for  many  years  exceeded  yearly  social  security  contributions  and  this 
further  depresses  national  saving  via  the  government  budget.  Other 
factors,  however,  may  have  tended  to  raise  household  saving,  namaly  the 
incentive  that  pension  systems  have  created  for  earlier retirement  and  the 
less  than full  indexation of  pensions,  especially for  people  in the hi&her 
income  brackets.  The  less  than  full  indexation  and  the  faet  that  social 
security  benefits  are  not  transferable  to  future  generations  should  make 
social  security  wealth  a  less  than  perfect  substitute  of  private  wealth. 
Nevertheless,  especially  in  countries  where  the  unfunded  so'cial  security 
systems  are  in  deficit,  the  effect  on  national  saving  is  likely  to  be 
highly negative.  Von  FUrstenberg  and  Malkiel maintain  that  for  the  United 
I  ,'  States,  by  far  the  greatest  potential  effect  of  government  policy  on 
,  I 
I  I  household  saving  arises  from  government  retirement  programmes  (Von 
FUrstenberg  and  Malkiel,  1977,  P•  844). 
The  channels  isolated above  suggest an overall negative net  impact 
of  the  growth of  tax-transfer programmes  on  capital accumulation. 
On  the  second  most  important  combination  of  growth  in 
expenditure-financing,  the  case  of  bond  financed  increases  in  transfers, 
the  crucial  issue  is  whether  people  are  perfectly  rational  or  not.  If 
people  were  perfectly  rational  and  took  fully  into  account  future  tax 
liabilities arising  from  higher  interest  payments  on  a  larger public debt, 
debt  finance  would  be  equivalent  to  taxation  and  the  previous  analysis 
would  apply. -37-
Martin Feldstein  (1982)  calls  this hypothesis  the  pre-Ricardian hypothesis 
and  points  out  that  it had  been,  by  some,  wrongly  attributed  to  Ricardo. 
Indeed  Ricardo  stated  clearly  that  there  is  no  tax  equivalence  and  no 
perfect rationality. 
Modern  supporters  of  the  pre-Ricardian  hypothesis  are  Bailey 
{1962)  and  Barro  (1974).  Even  if  the  more  sophisticated  class  of  bond 
hoiders  correctly  foresees  the  implication  of  debt  financing  for  future 
interest payments  and  tax liabilities,  the classes which are more  likely to 
bear  the  burden  of  future  tax  payments  might  not  be  aware  of  it.  It is 
reasonable  to conclude,  in line with the  thinking of  Ricardo  and  Feldstein, 
that  there is no  full  discounting  of  future  tax  liabilities in Europe  and 
that  government  bonds  are  at  least  to  a  large  extent  net  wealth.  Under 
these  circumstances  the  effect  of  debt  financing  on  saving  and  capital 
formation  ~11 be worse  than in the case of  taxation financing. 
By  spending  the  proceeds  of  bond  sales  on  productive  investment 
the  government  can  outweigh  the  negative effects of  the  bond  issues  on  the 
country's capital stock.  For  this reason it was  a  solidly established rule 
in  the  pre-keynesian  public  fi,nance  literature  that  governments  should 
issue debt only to finance  public  investment. 
Adam  Smith  devoted  the  last  chapter  of  his  book  to  public  debt. 
He  thought  that debt  issue would  reduce  the  stock of private capital by  the 
same  amount  as  the  increase  in debt.  However  this, one-to-one substitution 
of government  debt  for  private capital is based  on  the  assumption  that  the 
proceeds  of  the  sale  of  bonds  are  not  used  to  finance  investment  and  that 
the  additional  current  government  expenditure  have  no  value  for  the 
worker-voter·. -38-
A  one-to-one  long  run  substitution  of  public  debt  for  private 
capital  follows  also,  under  certain  conditions,  from  neoclassical  growth 
models.  Phelps  and  Shell  ( 1969)  have  shown  that  if  public  debt  is 
increased when  the economy  is in the golden rule position, which guarantees 
the highest  consumption per capita,  the  substitution is one-to-one.  If the 
capital  stock  per  capita  is  below  the  golden  rule  level,  private  capital 
falls by more  than the  increase  in public  debt  and  vice versa if the  stock 
of capital is initially above  the golden rule level.(1) 
Consideration of  the value workers-voters  place on  current govern-
ment  expenditure  may  somewhat  reduce  the  degree  of  crowding  out  of private 
capital  in  the  long  run.  This  is  likely  to  occur  particularly  if  the 
proceeds  from  the  sale of  bonds  are used  to  finance  transfer  payments.  In 
this  case,  households'  disposable  income  increases,  since  transfers  are 
part  of  it  and  saving  is  likely  to  increase  somewhat,  thus  reducing  the 
fall in the private stock of capital. 
Since  most  of  the  growth  of  public  expenditure  in  Europe  during 
the  period under  analysis has  been  on  transfers,  the  transfer-debt increase 
has  probably  caused  a  less  than  one-to-one  crowding  out  in  Europe.  How-
ever,  the  fact  that  the  full  employment  stock  of  capital  per  capita  in 
Europe  is  mast  likely  still  below  the  level  implied  by  the  golden  rule 
would  suggest  a  more  than  one-to-one  crowding  out.  Whether  the  first  or 
the  second  factor  prevails,  the  conclusion  cannot  be  escaped  that  debt 
financing  has  very negative effects  on  the  country's capital  accumulation, 
except when  it is used  to  finance  productive  investment. 
7.  Policy implications for  the long  run and  the short run 
In  the  previous  sections  it  was  argued  that  the  tax-financed 
growth  in government  expenditure  which  has  occurred  in  Europe  in  the  last 
20-25  years  has  caused  unemployment  and  slowed  down  the  rate  of  economic 
growth during  the period.  It was  further  argued  that particularly the debt 
financed  part  of  the  growth  in  government  expenditure  has  had  negative 
(1)  For a  proof  see also Von  FUrstenberg  and Malkiel  (1977). -39-
effects on  capital accumulation and  economic  growth.  Productive public in-
vestment,  expenditure  on  education and  on  research and  development  have not 
been  among  the  most  dynamic  components  of  government  expend!  ture  and  it 
seems  safe  to  say  that  they  have  not  been  able  to  outweigh  the  negative 
effects of  the  growth  of  current  government  expenditure,  taxation and  debt 
discussed  in  this  paper.  If  the  arguments  advanced  are  correct,  the  long 
run  cost  of  the  growth  of  government,  the  way  it has  occurred  in  Europe, 
would  have  to  be  reassessed.  Since  we  do  not  know  the  social  welfare 
function,  it is difficult to  reach firm conclusions.  However,  if the costs 
of  a  large  government  sector  of  the  type  we  now  have  in  Europe  are  sub-
stantially higher  than originally  thought,  overall  government  expenditure, 
taxation  and  public  debts  have  to  be  reduced  substantially,  or  the 
structure  of  government  e-,cpenditure  changed  drastically,  i.e.  productive 
public  investment and  e-,cpenditure  on  research and  development  and  education 
should be  increased substantially. 
Unfortunately  economic  science  does  not  tell  us  how  to  estimate 
the  optimal  size  of  government  in  each  country.  However,  the  fact  that 
towards  the  end  of  the  sixties  a  major  wage  push  occurred  in  several 
European  countries,  particularly  in  the  United  Kingdom,  France  and  Italy 
may  suggest  that  pressures  for  the  shifting  forward  of  the  increased 
taxation  into  higher  real  wages  had  been  building  up  already  in  the 
si-,cties.(1) 
One  important  element  which  has  been  neglected  in  the  previous 
sections  are  the  spillover  effects  of  more  unemployment,  less  capital 
accumulation  and  lower  economic  growth  from  one  country  to  its  trade 
partners.  The  same  question  could  be  put  differently  by  asking  how  much 
would  a  country  benefit if it embarked  in  isolation  upon  a  policy  of  sub-
stantially  reducing  the  size  of  government  with  respect  to  the  case  in 
which  concerted  action  with  the  major  trade  partners  is  taken.  First 
(1)  The  narrow wedge,  as measured  in Table  4A  increased by  40.6  per cent in 
the United  Kingdom  from  1960  to  1968,  23.5  per cent in France and  21.5 
per cent in Italy.  In  Sweden  and  the  Netherlands it increased  by  64.4 
per  cent  and  39.6  per  cent  respectively.  Germany  and  the  US 
e-,cperienced  the  lowest  growth  rates  of  the  wedge:  10.4  per  cent  in 
Germany  and  16.5  per  cent  in  the  US.  In  Japan  the  increase  was 
substantial  (28.5  per  cent),  but  both  in  1960  and  1968  the  wedge  was 
still by far  the  lowest  than in any other country in the  sample. -40-
higher  economic  growth  in  neighbouring  countries  stimulates  exports  and 
employment  at home.  Second,  the reductions in real domestic  interest rates 
arising from  lower  public  debts  in a  small  country,  without  corresponding 
reductions  in  ot~er  countries  can  be  expected  under  integrated  financial 
markets  to be  quite small.  All  EC  countries acting  together  could  instead 
exert a  significant impact  on  the level of world interest rates.  These  two 
factors  would  argue  in favour  of  concerted  action.  Third,  if one  country 
acted  in  isolation  the  lower  real  wage  costs  and  higher  profit  margins 
during  the  adjustment  process  would  attract direct  investment  from  abroad 
and/or  lure  domestic  capital  back  at  the  expense  of  trading  partners. 
Thus,  on  balance,  small  countries  could  be  as  well  off  by  acting  in 
isolation  than  in  cooperation.  However,  such  isolated  actions  would  not 
solve the  current  problems  of  high  unemployment  and  low  economic  growth at 
the  EC-wide  level.  But  lacking  the  consensus  for  an  EC-wide  strategy  to 
substantially  reduce  the  size  of  government  in  the  long  run,  there 
certainly  are  enough  economic  incentives  for  one  or  a  subset  of  EC 
countries  to act alone. 
This  paper has dealt exclusively with  the very long  run effects of 
the growth of  the size of government.  The  policy prescriptions that follow 
from  the  analysis  completely  disregard  the  conditions  of  the  business 
cycle.  At  present  after  several  years  of  restrictive  fiscal  policy  in 
Europe  and  very  low economic  growth,  some  of  the existing high unemployment 
might  very  well  be  due  to  insufficient  aggregate  demand.  This  has  led 
some  economists(1)  and  policy  makers  to  suggest  that  European  governments 
should  expand  fiscal  policy.  There  is  not  necessarily  a  contradiction. 
between  the  use  of  fiscal  policy  for  cyclical  stabilisation and  the  long 
run objectives  formulated  in this  paper~  For  instance  a  more  expansionary 
fiscal  policy pursued  by  reducing  the  level of  taxation is consistent with 
the  long  run  objective  while  increasing  government  expenditure 
indiscriminately  is  not.  Therefore  a  temporary  increase  in  the  public 
debt/GDP  ratio.  above  previously  planned  levels  can  be  accepted  if  the 
business  cycle  is weak  and  some  of  the  existing unemployment  is keynesian. 
Furthermore,  higher  economic  growth  in  the  short  run  would  keep  the 
(1)  See  Basevi,  Blanchard,  Buiter,  Dornbusch  and  Layard  (1983)  and 
Blanchard  and  Dornbusch  (1985). -41-
increase  in  the  debt/GDP  ratio within  manageable  proportions  or  even  help 
reduce  it below  planned  levels.  A more  expansionary  fiscal  policy  pursued 
by  reducing  the level of taxation would  have  to be  accompanied,  with a  lag, 
by  cuts  in non-productive  government  expenditure  in order  not  to  raise the 
level of  the  debt  too much.  Announcements  of  these  expenditure  cuts  could 
be  made  at  the  time  the  tax  cuts  are  implemented  to  stabilise 
expectations.  In order to maximise  the short run effect of a  given tax cut 
on  unemployment  and  output  some  cuts  could  be  initially announced  to  be 
temporary. -42-
APPENDIX  1.  The  growth  of government  expenditure  and  of  public 
debt in Germany  1881-1979. 
Table  1.1:  Ratio  of  government  expenditure  to  NNP  in  Germany 
(in per cent) 
Total government  Government  expenditure, 
expenditure!  national accounts 
definition2 
1881  10.5  7.3 
1891  13.6  7.6 
1901  15.3  8.4 
1907  16.6  8.7 
1913  18.5  9.8 
1925  23.4  12.4 
1930  34.1  13.5 
1938  37.9  27.9 
1950  37.5  17.4 
1960  35.23  15.5 
1970  43.03  14.7 
1979  53.63  16.3 
1)  Central,  sta~e and  local government,  including transfers; 
ratio calculated on  figures  in current prices. 
2)  Ratio  calculated on  figures  in 1913  prices. 
3)  Source:  OECD,  Historical Statistics,  1960-1981  (1983). 
Sources:  Andie  and  Veverka  {1964),  Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Statistisches  Jahrbuch  fUr  die  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland, 
various  issues and  OECD,  Historical Statistics,  196Q-1981  (1983). -43-
Table  1.2:  Government  debt  as  percent  of  NNP  in  selected 
years.1 
Total government  Debt  of central 
debt  government 
1881  36.5  1.8 
1891  53.0  5.8 
1901  51.9  7.9 
1908  54.1  10.3 
1928  17.4  8.5 
1930  29.7  13.4 
1938  30.9  19.5 
1950  22.9  7.9 
1960  18.9  8.3 
1970  20.6  8.1 
1979  33.4  16.3 
1)  From  1881  to  1938  the  debt  refers  to  the  end  of  March, 
afterwards  to the end  of December. 
Source:  Deutsche  Bundesbank  (1976). -44-
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